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Abstract
Patentability of basic research together with complementarity between basic
research and commercialization development leads to the problem called ”anti-
commons” where assigning exclusive rights of a resource to more than one entity
reduces usage of the resource. Transition from (not-for-proﬁt) National University
to (proﬁt-seeking) University Corporation in Japan may actualize a nightmare of
the anti-commons in product innovations of some ﬁelds such as biotechnology. This
paper, using a two-stage patent race model, shows that we need more expenditure
on basic research to compensate for negative eﬀect of the anti-commons on R&D:
as a consequence of the transition to University Corporation, (1) interim expected
proﬁts of ﬁrms evaluated at the beginning of the commercialization stage become
less than half, (2) ex ante expected proﬁts of ﬁrms evaluated at the beginning of the
basic research stage decrease if total expenditures on basic research under National
University is less than twice that under University Corporation, and (3) for social
welfare to increase, total expenditure on basic research must increase in the case
where consumer surplus is high relative to total revenue from patents and there is
a small number of ﬁrms competing in the development stage.
*The author thanks participants in a seminar at GRIPS for their comments.
The remaining errors are the author’s.
11I n troduction
Private ownership in resource implies that a person or agent is given both usage
and exclusion rights. The conventional commons problem emerges as more than
a single person or agent is assigned usage rights. When more than one person is
assigned exclusion rights to a resource and these rights are simultaneously exer-
cised, the resource is underutilized, in contrast to overutilization of resource in the
conventional commons problem. In the shift from socialist to market institutions in
Russia, several ”de facto” owners of a building were allowed to exercise exclusion
rights and to charge rents individually. One had to pay all the owners these rents,
each of which may have been small but the sum of which was extremely high. As
a result, no one was willing to rent a room so that the building was almost empty.1
Heller (1998) calls this phenomenon ”the tragedy of the anticommons”. Buchanan
&Y oon (2000), pointing out symmetric aspects between the conventional commons
and the anticommons problems, present a formal model of ”the tragedy of the an-
ticommons”.
Aw arning on the anticommons problem in R&D was made by Heller & Rosen-
burg (1998) and Shapiro (2001). When upstream and downstream technologies are
complementary to each other to produce a new product and each technology is
patentable and possessed by diﬀerent parties, price of the new product becomes
high and its consumption ends up being small. A typical case is a new drug that
is produced based on knowledge of DNA sequences. A research company ﬁnds a
fraction of DNA sequences and gets its patent, while a pharmaceutical company,
using a ﬁnding of the DNA fraction, develops a new drug which is also patentable,
but fails to capture all the revenue from the new product that the pharmaceutical
company would earn if knowledge of DNA sequences is free of charge.2 When basic
research and development of a new product are technologically complementary to
each other and both patentable, the anticommons problem arises and incentive to
develop a new product deteriorates. Furthermore if many research companies get
patents of many diﬀerent parts of DNA sequences and new drugs are produced only
based on more than one part of DNA sequences, the anticommons problem and its
eﬀect on incentive to develop new drugs will be more serious.
Although the anticommons problem reduces incentive to develop new products,
it raises incentive to do basic research (and obtain its patent) compared with the
case where basic research is public good, i.e., not patentable. As Heller & Rosen-
burg (1998, p. 700) point out, it has not been examined which eﬀect of incentive
dominates. This paper is the ﬁrst attempt to analyze total eﬀects of the anticom-
mons on R&D in the context of the transition of National University to University
Corporation in Japan.
The anticommons problem has never been a serious problem so far in Japan.
1There is an implicit assumption in this example: the building is only one available in a nearby
area so that competition among buildings does not work.
2There is still a controversy about whether basic research should be patentable or not. However,
the de fact trend is that patent claims of basic research such as ﬁndings of DNA sequences by
many research ﬁrms have become their vested interests.
2This is because National Universities3, receiving more than three quarters of total
fund devoted on basic research in Japan (Kneller (2003, p. 357)), has been and is the
only entity capable of doing basic research and under severe regulations in Japan.
Since researchers in National University are civil oﬃcials, they had been eventually
prohibited from earning incomes by selling their (public funded) inventions until
recently.4 Firms engaged in developing new products were able to use results of basic
research achieved by National University for free or at a small amount of donation
paid to individual researchers for their inventions.5 Results of basic research have
been almost public goods in Japan. There has been no cause of the anticommons
problem so far.
However, the situation is changing. National University is about to become
one of Independent Administrative Entities, called University Corporation, in 2004.
Each of University Corporation takes responsibility for its administration includ-
ing ﬁnancial accounts to some extent, while it is allowed to earn incomes from its
inventions. Subsidy to each of University Corporation is no longer guaranteed. Uni-
versity Corporation is under strong pressure to manage eﬃciently and earn incomes
from the outside. Actually the Ministry of Education6 has encouraged universities
to obtain patents of their inventions and engage in cooperative research activities
with private ﬁrms through establishing Technology License Oﬃce for the past few
years. The transition of National University to University Corporation implies that
results of basic research will suddenly change from public goods to private goods and
that the anticommons problem will emerge in the product innovation where basic
research and development of new products are complementary.7 This paper inves-
tigates eﬀects of the transition of National University to University Corporation on
social welfare and expected proﬁts for ﬁrms engaged in product developments. Our
conclusion is that expected proﬁts and social welfare will decrease in the transition
under the current situation. A decline in incentive to develop new products is so
large that incentive for universities to do basic research must increase so much to
dominate in total eﬀects. This condition is not satisﬁed under the current situation,
as discussed in the last section.
3In what follows, when I refer to National University, it includes government research institutes
and some universities funded by municipal governments.
4See Kneller (2003) for tedious procedures for patents and other cooperative research activity
with private companies.
5Donations to individual researchers of National University are exceptionally allowed in the
regulation.
6We use this shorter name rather than the formal name, the Ministry of Education, Sports and
Science.
7The reader might wonder why U.S. universities, which have been in a similar situation to
University Corporation, have not brought about the anticommons problem. Jensen & Thursby
(2001), based on a vast survey, point out that it is necessary to modify work of basic research in
order for it to take a form of easy commercialization and that the modiﬁcation is an obstacle to
smooth transfer of basic research results. However, this argument does not apply to the recent case
of new drugs based on knowledge of DNA sequences, where smooth transfer of basic research results
eventually takes place. Furthermore, Jensen & Thursby (2001) seem to discuss any invention
developed in university and are opaque about whether the invention is of basic research and
whether there is technological complementarity between the invention and commercialization.
3The model we present in this paper is similar to models of Aoki & Nagaoka
(2002, 2003)). They concern how conditions of patentability such as utility stan-
dard aﬀect incentive to innovate and social welfare. Their two-stage patent race
models with free entry at each stage, trade secrecy, and ﬁxed cost assume that ﬁrms
can engage in patent races at both stages of basic research and commercialization
development. On the other hand, our two-stage patent race model assumes that uni-
versities specialize in basic research and ﬁrms in commercialization (development)
of new products, in which case we do not have to consider trade secrecy because it is
better (or safer) to obtain patent of discovery rather than to keep it secret. We also
assume a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms and universities at each stage. Otherwise we will
have zero (or reservation level) expected proﬁt for all the parties involved, which
seems implausible even if we take into account risk premium of R&D investment.
Our model simpliﬁes cost structure to the minimum: research intensity is regarded
as expenditure on research so that there is no cost diﬀerence among the parties.
We will discuss how robust our results are even in the case of diﬀerent costs in the
section of some extensions.
A new aspect of our model is to compare expected proﬁts and social welfare
under diﬀerent systems, in one of which some parties (National University) do not
seek proﬁt. There are some researches on how diﬀerently non-proﬁt organizations
behave from proﬁt-seeking organizations (James & Rose-Ackerman (1986), Rose-
Ackerman (1996)). However, it is diﬃcult to avoid a criticism that what is assumed
as the objective function of non-proﬁt organization in fact determines diﬀerences of
behavior between non-proﬁt and proﬁt-seeking organizations. So we take a primitive
treatment of behavior of National University: we assume intensity of (expenditure
on) basic research at each of National University exogenously given. In spite of the
primitive treatment, we can make some interesting comparisons, as we will show in
the proceeding sections.
Strictly speaking, the anticommons problem presumes independent setting of
patent fees rather than bargaining among patent holders. In our model, however,
we assume that patent holders bargain for share of maximized revenue from a new
product. This assumption not only simpliﬁes our model but also mitigates eﬀects of
the anticommons at the development stage. Therefore our results would be strength-
ened if patent holders set patent fees independently as in the original anticommons
problem.
With our model we show that (1) interim expected proﬁts of ﬁrms evaluated
at the beginning of the commercialization stage become less than half, that (2)
ex ante expected proﬁts of ﬁrms evaluated at the beginning of the basic research
stage decrease if the ratio of total expenditures on basic research between before
and after University Corporation is less than the ratio of interim expected proﬁts
between before and after University Corporation (which is less than one half), and
that (3) for social welfare to increase, total expenditure on basic research must
increase in the case where consumer surplus is high relative to total revenue from
patents and there is a small number of ﬁrms competing in the development stage.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We develop a simple two-stage patent
race model and compare expected proﬁts under both university systems in the next
4section. In section 3, we construct iso-welfare contours and make a comparison of
welfare under both university systems. All the proofs are in the Appendix. We dis-
cuss possible extensions of the simple model to capture more realistic circumstances
in section 4. In the last section, we brieﬂy discuss implications for the transition to
University Corporation.
2A Simple Two-Stage Patent Race Model
Let us consider a simple two-stage patent race model where upstream and down-
stream technologies of product innovation are complementary to each other. We
assume that only universities specialize in basic research at the research stage and
only private ﬁrms in commercialization at the development stage.8 Both basic re-
search and commercialization of product innovation are assumed patentable with
inﬁnite length. After basic research is ﬁnished, commercialization starts. There is
no time lag between research ﬁnding and patent approval. There are m ﬁrms in
the development stage and n universities in the research stage (m ≥ 1 and n ≥ 1).
We assume in this section that a (cross) license contract is not allowed between a
university and a ﬁrm, among ﬁrms and among universities.
We assume the Poisson discovery process for basic research and commercializa-
tion, respectively. We regard research intensity in the Poisson discovery process as
research expenditure for simplicity.9 Firms and universities are assumed to have
symmetric constant marginal R&D costs with no ﬁxed cost.
It is necessary and worthwhile to explain how this paper formulates behavior
of university. In the case of University Corporation, we could treat University
Corporation as if it maximized its ”proﬁt (revenue minus cost)” of its research
activity. Since University Corporation will face budget cuts and have to earn their
own ”proﬁts” or ”incomes” to cross subsidize pure basic research such as philosophy
and astronomy as well as overhead functions such as library, ”proﬁt” maximization
is acceptable as behavior standard of University Corporation.
In the case of National University, there seems no consensus (no argument so far)
on how economists should formulate the objective function of national university.10
Even if we assume that national university behaves as if it maximized a particular
objective function such as probability of research success subject to budget and
other constraints, equilibrium variables of national university will not be far from
those arbitrarily given, as long as the particular objective function is not convincing.
Therefore we have no choice but to exogenously give particular values to variables
8To avoid complications, by abuse of name, I sometimes use ”universities” rather than ”uni-
versity corporations” even when I refer to the case of university corporations.
9As we will see, as long as R&D costs are symmetric, it does not matter to distinguish research
intensity from research expenditure.
10There are some analytical models of non-proﬁt organization with explicit objective functions.
See Estelle James & Susan Rose-Ackerman (1986) and Susan Rose-Ackerman (1996). However,
they do not analyze (state-run) university explicitly as non-proﬁt organization.
5of national university in our model. Despite of the obstacle, we can make some
comparisons of proﬁts and social welfare, as we will see later.
Since our model is of two-stage, we will ﬁrst analyze patent races in the devel-
opment stage. Then we will examine the research stage given the equilibrium in the
development stage. Finally in this section we will compare proﬁts under University
Corporation with those under National University.
2.1 The Development-Stage Patent Race
Let V be the total revenue evaluated at the time of successful commercialization of
the product innovation in question. Under National University, a ﬁrm can receive all
the total revenue, V ,i fi tsucceeds in commercialization, since universities publish
and avail at free their research results without claiming patent rights. Thus the
patent race in the development stage (after some university has succeeded in the
basic research) under National University has the same structure as that of the
typical patent race model.
Firm j maximizes the following expected proﬁt with respect to its own research






j=1 ybj and r is the interest rate. Suberscript, b, indicates ”before”
universities becoming Independent Administrative Entity (University Corporation).









Equilibrium is symmetric (ybj = yb for j =1 ,2,···,m ) and characterized by
the following equation of total expenditure, Yb.
V {(m − 1)Yb + mr} = m(Yb + r)
2, (1)
Yb = myb. (2)
Under University Corporation, both ﬁrm and university, having succeeded in
R&D and obtained patents respectively, can eventually exercise exclusive rights to
realization of revenue from the product innovation in question because of comple-
mentarity between basic research and commercialization development. The ﬁrm
and university are in a position of bilateral monopoly after commercialization is
ﬁnished and patented. Since expenditure on R&D becomes sunk cost at that time,
the ﬁrm and university divide total revenue, V , equally between them. The amount
of revenue a ﬁrm expects to receive if it succeeds is V/2. Given this diﬀerence,
patent race is conducted in a similar fashion.
6Firm j maximizes the following expected proﬁt with respect to its own research






j=1 yaj. Suberscript, a, indicates ”after” universities becoming
Independent Administrative Entity (University Corporation). The ﬁrst-order con-









Equilibrium is symmetric (yaj = ya for j =1 ,2,···,m) and characterized by the
following equation of total expenditure, Ya.
(V/2){(m − 1)Ya + mr} = m(Ya + r)
2, (3)
Ya = mya. (4)
2.2 The Research-Stage Patent Race
In the case of National University, we assume that expenditure on basic research at
each university, xbi for i =1 ,2,···,n,i sexogenously given. That is, xbi =¯ xbi for
i =1 ,2,···,nand total expenditure is denoted by ¯ Xb ≡
n
i=1 ¯ xbi.
In the case of University Corporation, each university maximizes its ”proﬁt”
with respect to its expenditure on basic research, taking into account equilibrium of
the patent race by ﬁrms in the commercialization stage. The expected revenue each
university will receive at the time when it ﬁrst succeeds is Vu ≡ Ya
Ya+r(V/2). Given
research expenditures by other universities, university i maximizes the following
















Equilibrium is symmetric (xai = xa for i =1 ,2,···,n) and characterized by the
following equation of total expenditure, Xa.
7(Vu){(n − 1)Xa + nr} = n(Xa + r)
2, (5)
Xa = nxa. (6)
2.3 Comparison of Expected Proﬁts
Let us examine changes in proﬁts of ﬁrms from National University to University
Corporation. There are two kinds of expected proﬁt to be examined in our model,
depending on the time at which proﬁts are evaluated. The ﬁrst type is expected
proﬁt evaluated at the beginning of the development stage where some university has
succeeded in basic research and its result has become available to ﬁrms. This type
of proﬁt may be called ”interim” expected proﬁt, based on prior information that
basic research is successfully achieved. The second type is expected proﬁt evaluated
at the beginning of the research stage where universities start their research. This
type of proﬁt may be called ”ex ante” expected proﬁt, based on no information
revealed. We will examine how these two types of expected proﬁt change when
National University moves to University Corporation.
We denote equilibrium interim expected proﬁt of ﬁrm j under National Univer-
sity by πb.( We drop a subscript j because of symmetry.) Similarly, we equilibrium

















where asterisk (*) indicates equilibrium variables. Both interim expected proﬁts
are represented by the form of indirect proﬁt function P(V ) and P(V/2) respectively.
In what follows, we make an assumption that V is greater than a certain positive








11Assumption 1 implies that expected revenue of R&D for ”industry” as a whole is greater than
twice the interest rate. This condition seems plausible.
8By analyzing indirect proﬁt functions we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1















Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 show how much the anti-commons eﬀect reduces
interim expected proﬁts of ﬁrms engaged in commercialization development. Interim
expected proﬁts become less than half as a result of the transition to University Cor-
poration. Under University Corporation, if a ﬁrm succeeds in commercialization,
it gets one-half of the total revenue that it would get under National University.
This reduction of expected revenue holds for any level of research expenditure. It
will suﬃce to reduce research expenditure to one-half in order to keep expected
proﬁt one-half, if the expected revenue does not depend on research expenditure.
However, the reduced revenue lowers commercialization investments by ﬁrms, which
delays success of commercialization on average. This further reduces expected rev-
enue for ﬁrms. This causes expected proﬁt to decrease more than proportionally.
Mathematically this logic is reﬂected in convexity of proﬁt function, P(T), in the
proof.
It is a little harder to examine ex ante expected proﬁts. Ex ante expected proﬁts
are deﬁned as interim expected proﬁts multiplied by total probability of success in
basic research. In the case of National University, ex ante expected proﬁt, Πb,i s
Πb ≡ πb{
¯ Xb
¯ Xb + r
} = P(V ){
¯ Xb
¯ Xb + r
}.








where Xa satisﬁes Equation (5).
Let v be the ratio of interim expected proﬁt under University Corporation to
that under National University. We deﬁne by µ the ratio of total expenditure on
basic research under University Corporation to that under National University such
9that ex ante expected proﬁts under both university systems are equal to each other.
Then we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2
Let v ≡ πa/πb = P(V/2)/P(V).
(1) In the case where v/(1 − v) ≤ ¯ Xb/r,Π b > Πa.
(2) In the case where v/(1 − v) > ¯ Xb/r,Π b > Πa if and only if
Xa <µ¯ Xb,where µ ≡ 1/{v − (1 − v)( ¯ Xb/r)} =( 1 /v)+{(1 − v)/v}(Xa/r).
Corollary 2
In the case where v/(1 − v) > ¯ Xb/r,Π b > Πa if Xa ≤ (1/v) ¯ Xb.
Part (1) of Proposition 1 shows that when total expenditure on basic research
under National University is larger than the threshold level (rv/(1 − v) ≤ ¯ Xb), ex
ante expected proﬁt under National University is higher than that under University
Corporation without any further conditions. In this case, total expenditure on basic
research under National University has reached such a level that basic research is
suﬃciently encouraged. Thus there is no room for increasing total basic research
expenditure and thus probability of success at the basic research stage in order to
oﬀset the decline in interim expected proﬁts. In this case, we can say that ex ante
expected proﬁts will decrease by transition from National University to University
Corporation.
However, this case is not plausible, since the condition for this case implies that
”the adjusted probability” that at least one university succeeds in basic research is
more than one-half under National University, since 1 <v / (1 − v) ≤ ¯ Xb/r means
that ¯ Xb/( ¯ Xb + r) > 1/2.
Part (2) of Proposition 2 and Corollary 2 characterize the remaining case. By µ
we denote the critical ratio of total expenditure on basic research under University
Corporation to that under National University at which ex ante expected proﬁts
under both systems are equal to each other. When total expenditure on basic re-
search under National University is smaller than the threshold level, it requires a
large increase in total research expenditure at the basic research stage to cancel out
the decline of interim expected proﬁts in the transition from National University to
University Corporation. Since v<1/2 from Corollary 1, it follows from Corollary 2
that total research expenditure at the basic research stage under University Corpo-
ration must be more than twice as large as that under National University in order
10to keep unchanged ex ante expected proﬁts of ﬁrms engaged in commercialization.
This result reﬂects the fact that we need a large increase in total basic research
expenditure to compensate for the reduction of interim expected proﬁts.12
2.4 Simulation of the Critical Ratio
It is worthwhile to examine exact values of µ for some plausible parameters by
simulation. We need to know exactly how large total expenditure on basic re-
search under University Corporation must be compared with that under National
University when we make a policy recommendation. We choose the equation µ =
(1/v)+{(1−v)/v}(Xa/r) for simulation since we want to limit parameterized vari-
ables to the original parameters. We ﬁrst solve two endogenous variables v and Xa
with respect to parameters V , m, n, and r.
Lemma 1
(1) Xa =( 1 /2n)[−{2nr − (n − 1)Vu} +

4rnVu +( n − 1)2V 2
u ]
where
Vu =( V/2)[(1/2m){−(2rm− (m − 1)(V/2))
+

2rmV +( m − 1)2(V 2/4)}{((m−1)V/4m)+(1/2m)

2rmV +( m − 1)2(V 2/4)}−1].
(2) v =( 1 /2)(pa/pb)2
where
pa = ya/(mya + r),p b = yb/(myb + r),
where
ya =( 1 /2m
2){−(2mr − (V/2)(m − 1)) +

2mrV +( m − 1)2V 2/4},
yb =( 1 /2m
2){−(2mr − V (m − 1)) +

4mrV +( m − 1)2V 2}.
12Mathematically speaking, the reduced form of interim proﬁt is convex in its argument (V or
V/2), while the ”adjusted probability” of success at the basic research stage is a concave function
of total research expenditure ( ¯ Xb or Xa ). Since ex ante expected proﬁt is the product of the
interim expected proﬁt and the ”adjusted probability” of success in basic research, total research
expenditure in basic research must increase more than the inverse of the reduction ratio of total
revenue (V )i norder to make ex ante expected proﬁt unchanged.
11The following results of comparative statics will reduce the number of the cases
we have to examine.
Lemma 2
(1) ∂Xa/∂V > 0,∂ X a/∂n > 0,∂ X a/∂m > 0, for m ≥ 2 ∂v/∂m < 0,
(2) ∂µ/∂n > 0, for m ≥ 2 ∂µ/∂m > 0,
(3) lim V →∞ Xa = ∞, lim V →∞ µ = ∞.
Part (1) of lemma 2 means that (a) the larger the total revenue from product
innovation, the larger the equilibrium total expenditure on basic research, that (b)
the larger number of university (ﬁrm), the more intensive R&D competition and the
larger the equilibrium total expenditure on basic research, and that (c) the larger
the number of ﬁrm, the more intensive R&D competition (except for monopoly)
ampliﬁes the negative eﬀect on interim expected proﬁts. Part (2) is derived from
Part (1). The larger the number of university, the larger the equilibrium total ex-
penditure on basic research and the larger the critical value. The larger the number
of ﬁrm, the larger the equilibrium total expenditure on basic research (except for
monopoly) and the larger the critical value. Part (3) is about limit values. As the
total revenue from product innovation becomes inﬁnity, the equilibrium total ex-
penditure on basic research approaches inﬁnity. As a result, the critical value goes
to inﬁnity.
It follows from Lemma 2 that we can concentrate our simulation on the cases
where n =1and m =1 ,2, since we are interested in the possible minimum value
of the critical ratio, µ. Lemma 2 also shows that we do not have to examine the
critical ratio for large values of V .W e set r at 0.1,0.2,0.3 taking account of risk
premium of R & D innovations. We simulate the critical ratio µ over the range from
V =2 r to V = 10.13 14
The simulation results are shown in Figure 1. (Figure 1 is omitted in this ver-
sion.) In all the cases, the minimum value of the critical ratio is around 4. This
means that total expenditure on basic research under University Corporation must
be at least more than four times as high as that under National University in order
to keep ex ante expected proﬁts of ﬁrms increasing after the transition. From these
simulation results, we can say that we will have to increase total expenditure on
basic research more than several times in the transition from National University to
13Assumption 1 restricts V to higher values than a certain endogenous level, which is strictly
larger than 2r. The broader range of V does not increase the minimum value of µ we look for.
14Since µ is decreasing in v, µ>2+( Xa/r). If n =1 ,m =1and V =3 2 r, then Xa =
(2
√
3 − 1)r   2.46r.T aking into account ∂Xa/∂V > 0 and V =3 2 r =9 .6 for r =0 .3, movement
of the above lower bound of µ is dominated by movement of Xa for V> 10.
12University Corporation to compensate ﬁrms engaged in commercialization develop-
ments for the reduction of their interim expected proﬁts due to the ”anti-commons”
eﬀect.
3S o cial Welfare
It is natural to ask eﬀects of the transition from National University to University
Corporation on social welfare (as long as we are concerned with product innovation).
In this section, we will introduce iso-welfare contours to analyze welfare changes
associated with the transition.
3.1 Iso-Welfare Contours
Let us deﬁne social welfare as the sum of expected consumer surplus and producer
surplus accruing from the product innovation. We do not include any value from
academic achievements in university research, though expenditure on basic research
is regarded as (opportunity) cost whether universities earn revenue from their basic
research or not. The social welfare thus deﬁned, S,i sgenerally expressed in terms of
the ”adjusted probability” of success at both stages, total revenue, V , and consumer
surplus from the new product, C,a sfollows.
S(X,Y) ≡{ X/(X + r)}[{Y/(Y + r)}(C + V ) − Y ] − X,
where X is total expenditure on basic research, Y is total expenditure on devel-
opment, and r is interest rate.15




2}{(Y/(Y +r))(C+V )−Y }−1]/[{X/(X+r)}{(r/(Y +r)
2)(C+V )−1}].
Let
ˆ Y ≡ argmax Y {Y/(Y + r)}(C + V ) − Y
and
ˆ X(Y ) ≡ argmax X {X/(X + r)}[{Y/(Y + r)}(C + V ) − Y ] − X.
When we deﬁne ˆ X(Y ), we assume that
{Y/(Y + r)}(C + V ) − Y> 0.
15Here we drop subscripts, a and b, because functional forms of social welfare are the same for
both systems of university.
13This condition seems to hold for relevant values of Y since
{Yb/(Yb + r)}(C + V ) − Yb > {Yb/(Yb + r)}V − Yb = m{(yb/(Yb + r))V − yb}.
The right-hand side is positive because inside of the parentheses is equilibrium
interim expected proﬁt of individual (and symmetric) ﬁrms. Similarly for the case
of University Corporation.
Note that ˆ Y and ˆ X(Y ) satisfy
(r/(ˆ Y + r)
2)(C + V ) − 1=0
and
{r/( ˆ X + r)
2}{(Y/(Y + r))(C + V ) − Y }−1=0 ,
respectively. From concavity of the maximand, note also that
{(r/(Y + r)
2)(C + V ) − 1} > (<)0i fY< (>) ˆ Y,
{r/(X + r)
2}{(Y/(Y + r))(C + V ) − Y }−1 > (<)0i fX>(<) ˆ X(Y ).
It is easy to see that ˆ X(Y )i sincreasing in Y if Y<ˆ Y and decreasing in
Y if Y>ˆ Y by calculating the slope of ˆ X(Y ). For later convenience of drawing
iso-welfare contours, we also show the slope of the inverse function:
∂Y/∂ ˆ X =2 [ {Y/(Y + r)}(C + V ) − Y ]/[{r/(Y + r)
2}(C + V ) − 1].
Having clariﬁed these properties, we can draw iso-welfare contours in the space
of total expenditure at the basic research stage, X, and total expenditure at the
commercialization development stage, Y . Figure 2 shows a typical iso-welfare con-
tour. The space is segmented into four areas by Y = ˆ Y and X = ˆ X(Y ). The
iso-welfare contour has a positive slope in the North-West and South-East areas
where the numerator and the denominator of the slope equation have the same
sign, a negative slope in the North-East and South-West areas where the numerator
and the denominator of the slope equation have diﬀerent signs. It follows from the
deﬁnition of ˆ Y and ˆ X(Y ) that social welfare is maximized at ( ˆ X(ˆ Y ), ˆ Y ), which
may be called social optimal pair of research expenditures. The closer a contour is
to the social optimal pair, the higher its associated social welfare is.16
16The easier construction of iso-welfare contours is as follows. The pair ( ˆ X(ˆ Y ),ˆ Y )i sthe social
optimum. As Y deviates from ˆ Y , expected social welfare on condition that basic research has
succeeded declines and optimal total expenditure on basic research, ˆ X(Y ), also decline. This
explains the shape of ˆ X(Y ). Iso-welfare contours cut across vertically at ˆ Y and horizontally at
ˆ X(Y ). Together with convexity of contours, we have circle-type contours.
143.2 Comparison of Welfare
Now that we have developed iso-welfare contours in the space of total expenditures
at both stages, we will examine social welfare changes in the transition from National
University to University Corporation. It is rather tedious and without clear results
to examine all possibilities (all positions of expenditure pairs) since total expenditure
on basic research under National University is treated as given as a parameter in
our model. Thus we limit the analysis to the segmented areas below the Y = ˆ Y line,
which is likely to correspond to the cases of product innovation such as biomedical
R&D, as we will see later.
Before we move on to the analysis, we make sure relative magnitudes of ˆ Y , Yb,
and Ya.
Lemma 3
(1) Yb >Y a.
(2) ˆ Y> Y b if m =1 .
(3) Suppose that C<{(V/r)−1}V . Then there exists m∗(2 ≤ m∗ < ∞) such
that ˆ Y ≤ Yb for all m ≥ m∗, while that ˆ Y> Y b for all m<m ∗.
(4) ˆ Y> Y b if C ≥{ (V/r) − 1}{(m − 1)/m}V.
Lemma 3 shows that total expenditure on commercialization development under
University Corporation is always smaller than that under National University. This
is a consequence of the ”anti-commons” eﬀect that reduces the revenue a successful
ﬁrm can appropriate. Lemma 3 also shows that total expenditures on commercial-
ization development never exceed the social optimal level, ˆ Y ,i fconsumer surplus
is large relative to the total revenue from the product innovation (the larger the
consumer surplus, the larger the ˆ Y ) and the number of ﬁrms at the development
stage is small (which mitigates intensive patent race and lower total expenditure
on R&D). These conditions seem to be satisﬁed in the case of biomedical inno-
vation. Demand for new and eﬀective drug is inelastic so that consumer surplus
is large relative to monopoly proﬁt from the drug.17 There are a limited number
of pharmaceutical companies worldwide that can develop new drugs based on new
discovery of biotechnology. It is safe to focus on the cases where both expenditure
levels at the development stage are less than the social optimum as long as we are
interested in the typical case such as biomedical innovation that attracts attention.
With iso-welfare contours and relative magnitudes of expenditures on commer-
17It is not diﬃcult to show that the ratio of consumer surplus to monopoly proﬁt converges
to inﬁnity as demand elasticity approaches unity under the assumptions of constant elasticity of
demand and constant marginal cost.
15cialization developments, we can show the range of total expenditure on basic re-
search under University Corporation in order to increase social welfare in the tran-
sition. Let X∗
b and X∗∗
b be Xb such that S(Xb,Y b)=S(Xa,Y a) and X∗
b <X ∗∗
b .
These total expenditures on basic research, given equilibrium total expenditure on
commercialization, guarantee the same level of social welfare as that under Univer-
sity Corporation. It is easy to prove the following proposition and corollary from
Figure 2.
Proposition 3




Suppose that ˆ Y ≥ Yb. Then S(Xa,Y a) >S ( ¯ Xb,Y b)i fand only if either ¯ Xb ≤
X∗
b <X a or Xa <X ∗∗
b ≤ ¯ Xb.
Corollary 3 implies that social welfare will increase in the transition if total ex-
penditure on basic research under National University is either too small ( ¯ Xb <X ∗
b
)o rt oo large ( ¯ Xb >X ∗∗
b ). In the former case, total expenditure on basic research
must increase in order to raise social welfare in the transition from National Uni-
versity to University Corporation. Anti-commons eﬀect reduces equilibrium total
expenditure on commercialization development so much that we need more expen-
diture on basic research to compensate for the decline of welfare. This mechanism
is reinforced in the case of a small number of ﬁrms in the development stage, where
patent race does not accelerate total expenditure so much. The eﬀect of anti-
commons on social welfare is ampliﬁed when consumer surplus is large compared
with total revenue from innovation.
In the latter case where total expenditure on basic research under National Uni-
versity is too large, expenditure on basic research is larger than the social optimum
given equilibrium total expenditure on commercialization, ˆ X(Yb). Transition to
University Corporation in this case reduces incentive to innovate for both ﬁrms and
universities and thus (equilibrium) total expenditure on basic research. This change
trims waste of basic research expenditure, though ex ante expected proﬁts of ﬁrms
decline (due to Proposition 2).
Theoretically there are two possible cases discussed above. To my knowledge,
however, no one has proposed that success in basic research should be less probable,
or that the ”adjusted probability” or equivalently total expenditure on basic research
should be smaller. It is safe to say that the current level of basic research expenditure
under National University is not in the East area of Figure 2. With this qualiﬁcation,
we can say that total expenditure on basic research must increase in order to improve
social welfare in the transition from National University to University Corporation.
16We will discuss implications of these results for the transition to University
Corporation in Section 5.
4 Some Extensions
We have considered so far a simple case of two-stage patent race with comple-
mentarity between upstream and downstream technologies. In what follows in this
section, we will examine how more realistic assumptions might aﬀect our results in
the previous section.
4.1 Asymmetric Costs of R&D
We have so far assumed that expenditure on R&D is equal to research intensity. This
assumption also implies no cost diﬀerence in R&D among ﬁrms and universities. A
natural extension is to assume that expenditure on R&D is proportional to R&D
intensity, say cj(yj)=cjyj for ﬁrm j and ci(xi)=cixi for university i, where yj and
xi are now interpreted as intensity of R&D, while cj and ci are constants. Since
equilibrium proﬁts (both interim and ex ante) are continuous in cost parameters,
slight perturbation of these parameters from cj =1for all j and ci =1for all i
induces only slight changes in equilibrium proﬁts. The same is true for (equilibrium)
total intensity of R&D, which is approximately equal to total expenditure. Thus
our results are not non-generic.18
When cost diﬀerences among ﬁrms are not negligible, it is easy to see that the
lower cost, the higher intensity and the larger interim expected proﬁt for a ﬁrm. We
may expect that interim expected proﬁts become less than half by the transition
to University Corporation under diﬀerent costs.19 When costs are diﬀerent among
universities (with no cost diﬀerence among ﬁrms), our results on ex ante expected
proﬁts hold by replacing ”total expenditure” with ”total intensity”. Equilibrium
condition for basic research intensity under University Corporation is rewritten as









Summing the above equation over all i,w eget





18It holds for more general cost functions that our results are generic.
19We have to quickly add a qualiﬁcation that neither ﬁrm nor university exits from patent races.
This qualiﬁcation imposes restriction on the diversity of cost diﬀerence we have to consider.
17where Xa is total intensity of basic research, Xa =
n
i=1 xai.I fw enormalize
arithmetic average of marginal cost as unity,
n
i=1 ci/n =1 ,the above equation
turns out the same as Equation (5). Since we assume xbi as given, total intensity
under National University, Xb,i salso given. Proposition 2 and Corollary 2 hold in
terms of ”total intensity” instead of ”total expenditure”.
However, we can rewrite these results in terms of total expenditure. Let Eb
and Ea be total expenditures on basic research under National University and Uni-
versity Corporation, respectively. By deﬁnition, we have ¯ Eb =
n
i=1 cixbi,E a =
n
i=1 cixai, ¯ Eb ≤ cHXb,E a ≥ cLXa, where cH and cL are the highest and lowest
marginal costs, respectively.20 Proposition 2 and Corollary 2 should be read as
”Πb > Πa if Ea <µ (cL/cH) ¯ Eb and ”Πb > Πa if Ea < (1/v)(cL/cH) ¯ Eb, respectively.
Since our simulation shows that the minimum value of µ is around 4, for moderate
cost diﬀerences such as cL/cH =1 /2w ecan say that we need more expenditure
on basic research under University Corporation than under National University in
order to increase ex ante proﬁts.
Our analysis on welfare (Proposition 3) also should be interpreted in terms of
”total intensity”.
4.2 Budget Constraints under University Corporation
We have assumed that University Corporation behaves as if it maximized its own
”proﬁt (revenue minus cost)”. Though each university corporation is to have some
discretion to earn its own incomes through patent fees and other businesses, the
Ministry of Education is to disburse most of expenses as subsidy. Furthermore no
measure to ﬁnance long-run risky projects is available to University Corporation.
This suggests that University Corporation will be still subject to its own budget
constraint and never achieve its optimal level of research intensity as an inner solu-
tion. Even in this case, our results hold except for those based on simulations, as
shown below.
Since research expenditures are strategic substitutes in our model, every univer-
sity faces the same constraint due to symmetry.21 In that case, total expenditure
on basic research should be interpreted as given. All propositions and corollaries
are still valid, though the results based on simulations are not. This is because we
eventually treat Xa parametrically in all propositions and corollaries other than in
simulations.
20What is given under National University is allocation of expenditure to each university. Re-
search intensity at each university is determined by allotted expenditure and marginal cost.
21Even under asymmetric costs, strategic substitutes imply that if one university has a corner
solution due to budget constraint, other universities are likely to have their corner solutions.
184.3 Ex ante Agreements
We have assumed no ex ante agreements between a university and a ﬁrm. It is well
known that ex ante agreements are sometimes crucial to incentive for innovation.22
In this subsection we will examine how ex ante agreements aﬀect interim and ex
ante expected proﬁts.23
Since we focus on product innovations, it is always better for a patent holder ﬁrm
to exclusively use the patent and earn monopoly proﬁt.24 In other words, there is
no incentive for a patent holder to license its invention to other ﬁrms or universities.
Thus it is safe to limit the analysis to the cases where ex ante agreement is concluded
between a ﬁrm and a university. There are two possible cases of ex ante agreements
between a ﬁrm and a university. One is an ex ante agreement after a university has
succeeded in basic research of the new product in question. The other is an ex ante
agreement before no university has started basic research.
When a successful university with patent of its basic research oﬀers ﬁrms an ex
ante agreement, the university is eventually a monopoly to these ﬁrms.25 It can
realize not only the ﬁrst-best outcome (for the university and a contracting ﬁrm)
but also extracting all proﬁts accruing from the new product by making an oﬀer
of ”take a contingent contract or leave it” to all competing ﬁrms26 and concluding
the contract with one (the lowest cost) ﬁrm exclusively. Thus the ﬁrm will get
zero expected proﬁt at the beginning of the development stage, while other ﬁrms
have zero proﬁt at all. The transition to University Corporation together with an
ex ante agreement at the beginning of the development stage will deprive ﬁrms of
proﬁt opportunity from product innovation.27
The analysis in the previous paragraph assumes that contractual agreements are
enforceable whatever happens in the future. This assumption seems implausible.
Suppose that a third party succeeded in commercialization for the ﬁrst place and
obtained its patent. Then the university with basic research patent will have to
lose huge proﬁt as long as it keeps the contractual agreement that it never allows
other ﬁrms to use its patent of basic research. The university has strong incentive
to breach the agreement and share patent revenue from a new product with the
third party. Consequently after a university succeeds in basic research, all other
ﬁrms will actually engage in a patent race in commercialization. Subgame perfect
22Following Green & Scotchmer (1995), by ”ex ante” I mean before investment cost is sunk
either at the research or development stage.
23We will not examine cooperative joint R&D activity through ex ante agreements. We will
not consider social welfare either. This is because, in analyzing social welfare, we need explicit
divisions of proﬁt between ﬁrms and universities, which is diﬃcult to get in a general setting.
24We exclude from the analysis an equivalent case where a patent holder ﬁrm lets another ﬁrm
to exclusively use the patent and earns monopoly proﬁt as (two-part tariﬀ) patent fee.
25When there is only one ﬁrm capable developing a new product, bilateral monopoly emerges
and the analysis is the same as one in the preceding sections.
26In other words, by auctioning a right to use exclusively patent of basic research with contingent
fees based on when a contracting ﬁrm succeeds in commercialization.
27In this case we have a clear conclusion on social welfare. Since a successful university can
control an innovation process of the development stage, the model is eventually reduced to the
one-stage patent race. Welfare analysis is also the same as that on the one-stage patent race.
19equilibrium outcome is likely to be realized in spite of ex ante agreement.28 Thus
ex ante agreements do not seem to appear in the case of product innovation with
supplementary technologies.
When ex ante agreements are allowed before no university has started basic re-
search, any division of proﬁt between ﬁrms and universities can take place, depend-
ing on balance of bargaining power among parties, as long as contractual agreements
are enforceable.29 This is because reservation proﬁts (or threat-point proﬁts) for all
parties are zero. This result might be general, but as we discussed in the previous
paragraph, ex ante agreements do not seem to appear even in this case.
All in all, possibility of ex ante agreements does not aﬀect our analysis in the
preceding sections.
4.4 Multiple Patent Holders and Multiple Applications of
Basic Research
When there is more than one patent holder of basic research, interim expected
proﬁts decline further and more total expenditure on basic research is necessary to
compensate for the reduction of interim expected proﬁts and keep ex ante proﬁts
non-decreasing.30 Multiple patent holders reinforce the eﬀect of transition to Uni-
versity Corporation on welfare, requiring more total expenditure on basic research
in order to increase welfare in the transition. This is exactly a nightmare called
”patent thicket” (Shapiro (2001)).
When basic research is applied to many diﬀerent developments of new products,
anti-commons eﬀect is mitigated on ex ante expected proﬁts and social welfare.
Since University Corporations expect to receive patent revenue of basic research
from more than one commercialization based on an application of the basic research,
equilibrium intensity of (or expenditure on) basic research is higher than in the case
of only one commercialization. If there is enough number of expected applications
of basic research to new products relative to the number of expected patent holders
of basic research used for these new products, total intensity of (or expenditure on)
the basic research under University Corporation will be high enough to compensate
28When revenue from a new product is small, in addition to the subgame perfect equilibrium
analyzed in the previous sections, there is another subgame perfect equilibrium in which a con-
tracting ﬁrm with the university with basic research patent chooses the monopoly level of research
intensity while other ﬁrms choose zero research intensity. Economic logic behind this case is as
follows. Since the revenue from a product innovation is small, patent race is not proﬁtable for
ﬁrms if more than one ﬁrm is involved, but proﬁtable for monopoly. Furthermore the ex ante
agreement can signal to other ﬁrms the commitment the contracting ﬁrm made. Therefore other
ﬁrms will be eventually in a position of followers and give up patent race.
29This is true if there is more than one party in both stages. If there is only one party in one of
the two stages, market force gives the party in a monopoly position all the surplus.
30As the number of patent holders increases, the parties are likely to set their patent fees
independently rather than bargain for division of maximized revenue from the new product. In
this case, as Buchanan & Yoon (2000) and Shapiro (2001) show, the revenue each party could get
is smaller than under bargaining, which exacerbates anti-commons eﬀects.
20for the reduced level of development activity.31
Although the number of possible applications of basic research may be deter-
mined technologically, the number of expected patent holders of basic research is
determined by strategic behavior of University Corporations. Many research com-
panies compete in ﬁnding a fraction of DNA sequences and registering it as patent
in the U.S. and Europe. So will University Corporations in Japan. It is safe to say
that we face a danger that expected proﬁts and social welfare will decline in the
transition to University Corporation unless a massive increase in total expenditure
on basic research is accompanied.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have shown how expected proﬁts and social welfare from new products would
decrease in the transition from National University to University Corporation unless
total expenditure on (intensity of) basic research increased under the latter system.
This conclusion results from the fact that multiple patent holders reduce more
incentive for ﬁrms to innovate by sharing revenue from innovation than increase
incentive for University Corporations to innovate.
Let us conclude by discussing implications for the transition to University Cor-
poration. Given the fact that basic research is patentable, the transition to Uni-
versity Corporation will deteriorate not only proﬁt opportunity of ﬁrms developing
new products but also social welfare under the current situation briefed below. In
other words, we surely expect that total intensity of basic research will not increase
enough under University Corporation so as to oﬀset the anti-commons eﬀect on
the development stage. In order to apply our propositions, we will ﬁrst make sure
the current situation on cost diﬀerences of research intensity among universities,
plausibility of budget constraints and changes in total research intensity.
We do not know exactly how diﬀerent costs of basic research are among universi-
ties. However, diversity of costs is limited by the participation constraint: university
corporations with negative expected ”proﬁts” due to high costs exits from patent
races. Thus it is safe to assume that cost diﬀerences are moderate. University Cor-
porations will be subject to budget constraint because they cannot ﬁnance long-run
risky projects and it will take universities a long time to accumulate internal reten-
tion. The National Budget Plan for 2004 ﬁscal year indicates that total subsidy to
University Corporation will be reduced by one percent every year. Although a new
research fund (”Center of Excellence Program”) concentrates on several ”promis-
ing” universities, its amount is much smaller than the one percent reduction of total
subsidy.32 This implies that total intensity of basic research will not likely increase
31This is true unless ”patent thicket” makes ﬁrms give up developments of new products and
government encourages basic research because of its externality under National University.
32According to Homepage of the Ministry of Education (www.mext.go.jp), the total amount of
”Center of Excellence Program” in 2003 is 15.8 billion yen, while 1 % of total subsidy to University
21enough to oﬀset the anti-commons eﬀect on the commercialization stage.
Having discussed that the current situation satisﬁes the conditions for our con-
clusion, we can say that University Corporation is worse than National University
for the ﬁrms engaged in developing new products and society as a whole even if
we limit our attention to purely economic beneﬁts.Ithink that it is at least worth-
while to reconsider the system of University Corporation from the viewpoint of the
anti-commons eﬀect on R&D.
Corporation in the 2004 budget plan is 144.7 billion yen.
22Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Let P(T) ≡
z(T)
Z(T)+rT − z(T) where z(T) and Z(T) satisfy
T{(m − 1)Z(T)+mr} = m(Z(T)+r)
2, (7)
Z(T)=mz(T). (8)
Then P(V )=πb and P(V/2) = πa. Since Z(r)=z(r)=0 ,P(r)=0. We will






+ {Tr/(mz + r)
2 − 1}(∂z/∂T). (9)
Substituting (8) into (7), totally diﬀerentiating (7) with respect to z and T,w e
have
∂z/∂T =
(m − 1)z + r
2m(mz + r) − T(m − 1)
.
Substituting (7) into the right-hand side of the above equation to eliminate T
and rearranging, we get
∂z/∂T = {(m − 1)z + r}
2[(mz + r){m(m − 1)z +( m +1 ) r}]
−1 > 0.




(T)=[ ( mz + r){m(m − 1)z +( m +1 ) r}]
−1z{(m − 1)z +2 r} > 0.
Diﬀerentiating the above equation with respect to T and rearranging, we get
P

(T)=[ ( mz + r){m(m − 1)z +( m +1 ) r}]
−22{(m − 1)z + r}(m +1 ) r
2(∂z/∂T).
Since ∂z/∂T > 0, P

(T) > 0. Thus P(T)i sincreasing and convex in T.







The left-hand side is equal to πa




Proof of Corollary 1
23(1/2)−(r/V )
1−(r/V) is decreasing in (r/V) and converges to 1/2a s( r/V) approaches zero.
Then Corollary 1 follows from Proposition 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
Πb > Πa ⇔
¯ Xb
¯ Xb+r/ Xa
Xa+r >v .Let µ ≡ Xa/ ¯ Xb such that
¯ Xb
¯ Xb+r/ Xa
Xa+r = v. Then
Πb > Πa ⇔ Xa <µ¯ Xb. Substituting µ ≡ Xa/ ¯ Xb to eliminate Xa and solving for µ,
we get
µ =1 /{v − (1 − v)( ¯ Xb/r)}.
The denominator must be positive since both Xa and ¯ Xb are positive. Thus
Statement (2) in Proposition 2 holds if v−(1−v)( ¯ Xb/r) > 0. Otherwise πb{
¯ Xb
¯ Xb+r}≥
πa. This means Πb > Πa. This proves Statement (1) in Proposition 2.
If we eliminate ¯ Xb in solving for µ,w eget
µ =( 1 /v)+{(1 − v)/v}(Xa/r).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 2
We have µ>(1/v). Thus Corollary 2 follows from Proposition 2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1
Part (1): Expanding Equation (5) with respect to Xa,w eh ave
nX
2
a +( 2 nr − Vu(n − 1))Xa + nr
2 − nrVu =0 .
Since Vu =( Y ∗
a /(Y ∗
a + r))(V/2) in equilibrium, Vu >rby Assumption 1. Thus
the above quadratic equation has a unique positive solution, which is explicitly
solved as follows.
Xa =( 1 /2n)[−{2nr − (n − 1)Vu} +

4rnVu +( n − 1)2V 2
u ]
Similarly we can solve Equation (3) for Ya.
Ya =( 1 /2m)[−{2mr − (m − 1)(V/2)} +

2rmV +( m − 1)2(V 2/4)]
Substituting into Vu and rearranging terms, we get
Vu =( V/2)[(1/2m){−(2rm− (m − 1)(V/2))
24+

2rmV +( m − 1)2(V 2/4)}{((m−1)V/4m)+(1/2m)

2rmV +( m − 1)2(V 2/4)}−1].
Part (2): Substitute Equations (1) and (3) into interim expected proﬁts respec-
tively, we get
πb = P(V )=Vy
2
b/(myb + r)
2 = V (pb)
2,





Thus v =( 1 /2)(pa/pb)2. Expanding Equation (1) with respect to Yb,w eh ave
the following quadratic equation.
mY
2
b +( 2 mr − V (m − 1))Yb + mr
2 − mrV =0 .
From Assumption 1, we have a unique positive solution of the above equation:
Yb =( 1 /2m){−(2mr − V (m − 1)) +

4mrV +( m − 1)2V 2}.
From Equation (2), we get
yb =( 1 /2m
2){−(2mr − V (m − 1)) +

4mrV +( m − 1)2V 2}.
Similarly, from Equations (3) and (4) we can have
ya =( 1 /2m
2){−(2mr − (V/2)(m − 1)) +

2mrV +( m − 1)2V 2/4}.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2
Part (1): ∂Xa/∂V =( ∂Xa/∂Vu)(∂Vu/∂V ) > 0 since, using Part (1) of Lemma
1,




−1/2{4rn+2 ( n − 1)
2Vu}] > 0,
∂Vu/∂V =( 1 /2){mya/(mya + r)} +( V/2){mr/(mya + r)
2}(∂ya/∂V ) > 0,
because, using Part (2) of Lemma 1,






Directly diﬀerentiating, we have






u (n− 1){2 −(n −1)/n}] > 0.
25∂Xa/∂m =( ∂Xa/∂Vu)(∂Vu/∂m) > 0,
since ∂Vu/∂m =( V/2){r/(Ya+r)2}(∂Ya/∂m) > 0 where ∂Ya/∂m > 0 analogous
to ∂Xa/∂n > 0.
∂v/∂m =( pa/pb){(−pa/p2
b)(∂pb/∂m)+( 1 /pb)(∂pa/∂m)}
=( pa/pb)2{(−1/pb)(∂pb/∂m)+( 1 /pa)(∂pa/∂m)}
We calculate each term in the curly bracket as follows.
(1/pb)(∂pb/∂m)=( r/(yb(myb + r)))(∂yb/∂m),
(1/pa)(∂pa/∂m)=( r/(ya(mya + r)))(∂ya/∂m).
Using Equations (1) and (3) and eliminating V ,w eh ave
∂yb/∂m = yb{(2 − m)yb − r}/{m(m − 1)yb + r(m +1 ) },
∂ya/∂m = ya{(2 − m)ya − r}/{m(m − 1)ya + r(m +1 ) }.
Substituting these results, we calculate the value of the curly bracket.
(−1/pb)(∂pb/∂m)+( 1 /pa)(∂pa/∂m)
= A[−{(2 − m)myayb − r2 + r((2 − m)yb − mya)}{(m − 1)mya + r(m +1 ) }
+{(2 − m)myayb − r2 + r((2 − m)ya − myb)}{(m − 1)myb + r(m +1 ) }],
where A ≡ r/[(mya+r)(myb+r){(m−1)mya+r(m+1)}{(m−1)myb+r(m+1)}].
Since yb >y a, the value of the curly bracket is negative if m ≥ 2.
Part (2): Using the results of Part (1), we have
∂µ/∂n =( ( v − 1)/vr)(∂Xa/∂n) > 0,
∂µ/∂m =( −1/v
2)(1 + (Xa/r))(∂v/∂m)+((1 − v)/vr)(∂Xa/∂m) > 0 for m ≥ 2.
Part (3): From the direct expression of Xa, lim V →∞ Xa = ∞. Since v
is bounded (0 <v<1/2), lim V →∞ µ = ∞ if v → 0a sV →∞ .T h u s
lim V →∞ µ = ∞. Q.E.D.
26Proof of Lemma 3
Let
Φ(Y ) ≡ Y
2 +2 rY + r
2 − r(C + V ),
Φb(Y ) ≡ Y
2 + {2r − (m − 1)V/m}Y + r
2 − rV,
Φa(Y ) ≡ Y
2 + {2r − (m − 1)(V/2)/m}Y + r
2 − r(V/2).
Note that Φ(ˆ Y )=0 ,Φb(Yb)=0 , and Φa(Ya)=0. Using these relations, we get
Φa(Yb)=( V/2){(m − 1)Yb + mr} > 0 since Yb > 0.
This implies that Yb >Y a. This completes part (1) of the Lemma. Similarly we
have
Φb(ˆ Y )=rC −{ (m − 1)/m}V ˆ Y.
Solving explicitly ˆ Y =

r(C + V )−r and substituting into the above expression,
we deﬁne F(C,V,m,r) ≡ (rC−{(m−1)/m}{

r(C + V )−r}. Then F(C,V,m,r) >
0i fand only if ˆ Y> Y b.
Since F(C,V,1,r)=rC > 0, ˆ Y> Y b if m =1 . This completes part (2) of
the Lemma.
Since ∂F/∂m = −V (

r(C + V ) − r)(1/m2) < 0, F(C,V,1,r)=rC > 0, and
F(C,V,∞,r)=rC − V (

r(C + V ) − r)=

r(C + V )(

r(C + V ) − V ), there
is an m∗ such that F(C,V,m,r) > 0 for all m<m ∗ and F(C,V,m,r) <
0 for all m ≥ m∗ if C<{(V/r) − 1}V. This completes part (3) of the Lemma.
We also have
F(k{(m − 1)/m}V,V,m,r)=V {(m − 1)/m}[rk −{

rV(1 + k(m − 1)/m) − r}]
>V{(m − 1)/m}[rk −{

rV(1 + k) − r}]






V ) ≥ 0i fk ≥ (V/r) − 1.
Thus F(C,V,m,r) > 0i fC ≥{ (V/r)−1}{(m−1)/m}V. This completes part
(4) of the Lemma. Q.E.D.
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Figure 1: Iso-Welfare Contours
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